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people understood the subscription finance mechanics that were stated in law. 
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 In the May 2005 issue of this Review was published ‘Financial markets can go mad: 
evidence for irrational behaviour during the South Sea Bubble’ by Dale, Johnson and 
Tang (hereafter DJT). The authors purported to have presented, for the first time, 
quantitative evidence of irrational pricing behaviour in financial markets during the 
South Sea Bubble. From their analyses flowed a larger set of conclusions about 
irrationality in financial markets and even the need for market regulation. Their 
conclusions also informed some of the discussion found in Dale’s monograph on the 
South Sea Bubble.
1
But the analyses presented by DJT are irretrievably flawed. The logical structure 
of the paper is like that of an inverted pyramid. A broad range of conclusions about 
irrationality, financial market inefficiencies, gambling manias and so forth during the 
South Sea Bubble rests upon one proposition that a pricing relationship between 
South Sea original shares and subscription shares was violated. DJT argued that this 
pricing relationship was the only one plausible and that irrationality could be the only 
possible reason for which it would be violated. As reasonable as their argument at first 
seems, DJT do not appear to have consulted the law on the subscription shares, which 
is the primary oversight from which all their subsequent errors flow. In this paper it 
will thus be shown that a) by not examining the legal and political history of the 
subscription shares, DJT present a history that is fundamentally counterfactual and b) 
how their data were selected, adjusted and presented just happened to make their 
arguments appear in the most favourable light possible. The main body of this paper 
contains four sections. Section I presents the theory of the pricing relationships that 
DJT discuss. In section II we demonstrate that the purpose of subscription finance and 
                                                 
1 Dale, The first crash. Where anything has been adequately stated by DJT, we do not restate it; the 
paper is written under the assumption the reader is thoroughly familiar with DJT. Dates are reported in 
old style (O.S.) for days and months, but not for years – the new year starting conventionally on 1 
January. Thanks are due to Stefan Altorfer, Antonia Clark, Larry Neal, Charles Nolan, Alex Trew and   2
its legal implementation was not very different for the South Sea Company in 1720 
than it was for other companies in 1720 and later in the eighteenth century. One of the 
great legal and political debates of late 1720 surrounded the validity of the South Sea 
subscription contracts; an analysis of this debate is found in appendix II. In section III 
it is shown how, by ignoring this debate, DJT could latterly justify an excision of very 
important data from their analyses. A large portion of the data that DJT retained for 
analysis were then adjusted so that it appeared that subscription values were smaller 
than original share values – an appearance that was highly favourable to their thesis. 
Section IV contains our conclusions. 
I. 
Subscription shares were sometimes referred to as subscription contracts and, as such, 
could have been possibly viewed as ironclad agreements between the issuer and the 
subscriber. That is, the subscriber was under strict obligation to pay the instalments on 
time and in full, otherwise the issuer had full legal right to recover the due instalments 
at the subscriber's cost, which included interest. This is the DJT hypothesis.  
If this was the proper way to view the subscription contracts, how would their 
value be determined? A subscription share would be worth one original share minus 
the discounted present value of all the remaining calls (the contemporary term for a 
requested instalment payment). On 20 June 1720, for example, an original share was 
worth about £760 (Poriginal share) and a subscription share (from the first series) was 
worth about £590 (Psubscription share). The difference between the two values was £170. 
The present value (PV) of the remaining 7 instalments (calls) of £30 each would have 
to have been smaller than £210, but a realistic value (at about a 4 or 5 per cent per 
annum discount rate) would also have been greater than £200. Thus we see that this 
particular subscription share was a bit too valuable to be in accord with the 
                                                                                                                                            
two anonymous reviewers for criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper   3
interpretation of the subscription contract given above unless one is willing to argue, 
as do DJT, that either the original share or the subscription share was priced 
irrationally. Thus the DJT hypothesis is basically: 
 P subscription share + PVcalls = Poriginal share, (1) 
the left-hand side of equation 1 being what they define as an original share 
‘equivalent’ value. If this equation does not hold, then the difference between the two 
sides of the equation must arise from irrational pricing errors. DJT’s purpose was not 
to demonstrate an irrational cause for the South Sea Bubble itself. Instead, their 
purpose was to demonstrate an even more fundamental ‘irrationality’, an inability of 
persons in 1720 to agree on the values of what DJT consider to be two perfectly 
equivalent classes of shares. Equation 1 is also a statement of a hypothetical linear 
relationship between subscription and original share values, a hypothesis which must 
be maintained if DJT’s econometric results are to be of any interest.  
An alternative hypothesis would be that the subscription shares were not 
equivalent to original shares, but had extra rights (such as the right to default upon 
instalment payments) attached to them and hence they were more valuable than 
original shares. DJT acknowledged the alternative hypothesis, but dismissed it.
2 If 
they had not done so, they would then have had to acknowledge that subscription 
shares contained special option values and the following inequality (and not equation 
1) would be expected to be found in the data: 
 P subscription share + PVcalls ≥ Poriginal share. (2) 
                                                                                                                                            
(http://ideas.repec.org/p/san/cdmawp/0508.html). All errors that remain in this paper are my own alone. 
2 DJT, pp. 257-8. Although DJT cite no one who advocates this hypothesis, it is not new. It was stated 
by Cochrane, ‘Review of Famous first bubbles’, p. 1153. It was stated again most recently by Neal, 
‘Book review of The first crash’.    4
In fact, inequality 2 implies that Poriginal share - PVcalls would have to serve as a lower 
bound on subscription share values.
3 Additionally, if the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted, then any equilibrium relationship between subscription and original share 
values will have to be nonlinear one. In that case none of the cointegration nor any of 
the causality analyses in the DJT paper will be appropriate and the empirical results 
will be of no interest.
4 Although much of the DJT paper is devoted to empirical 
analyses and although there is much in it that could be criticised, such as the 
reliability of testing for unit roots in daily data over very short time spans, we take the 
position that such criticisms are not of even secondary interest. As it was argued in the 
introductory text of this paper, the entirety of DJT’s analyses starts from and depends 
absolutely upon equation 1 being the correct relationship between subscription share 
values and original share values. It is equation 1 itself that is historically quite wrong. 
 
II. 
In this section we investigate the enforcement mechanisms pertinent to the money 
subscription contracts. It will be shown that neither the relevant secondary literature 
on eighteenth-century subscription contracts nor the relevant Parliamentary Act that 
described the mechanisms for enforcing subscriptions were discussed or even cited by 
DJT. 
Since its publication in 1938, DuBois’ The English business company has been 
the basic survey of all matters legal, organisational and financial for the eighteenth-
century British business corporation. DuBois’ opinions on the general enforceability 
of eighteenth-century subscription contracts are quite relevant to the specific cases of 
                                                 
3 DJT (pp. 248-9) claim that the inequality is at times even reversed in their data – we examine this 
claim in Section III. 
4 In option pricing theory option values are highly nonlinear functions of, at least, i) the value of the 
asset on which the option contract is written and ii) the volatility of returns on that asset (Cox and 
Rubenstein, Options markets, pp. 165-78, 186-7). For this reason econometric studies of the   5
the South Sea and other companies in 1720. In a few passages he makes his basic 
points and concludes, 
It is clear that no common law right of action was recognized and that, if a right 
to sue existed at all, it was believed to rest upon the privilege granted by the act 
of Parliament. Moreover, it was thought essential for the success of the action 




Whether the historian agrees or disagrees with DuBois, his study is still the basic 
starting point for a study of eighteenth-century subscription contract enforceability 
and it must be cited and discussed. 
In 1720 did no one write or say anything about how subscription contracts 
would be enforced? We start our search for enforcement mechanisms, as DuBois 
advised, with incorporating charters or parliamentary acts. In the South Sea 
Company’s case the relevant Act is 6 Geo.1, c.4 (April 1720). This is, of course, the 
very important Act that was destined to govern most all of the Company’s operations 
in 1720. When it came to raising new financing, we find the relevant passages we 
seek near the end of the Act.
6 The Act states that additional capital could be raised by 
a number of means, including a money subscription for shares.
7 The South Sea 
Company used these powers to launch four series of money subscriptions to the 
general public by a very simple device. A select group of Directors and prominent 
shareholders were issued the additional stock and were bound in trust to deliver to the 
Company any monies they raised from the sale of such stock to the public. Rather 
than being novel, this was a commonly used device. A variant of it was being 
                                                                                                                                            
relationships between option values and values of the option contracts’ underlying assets cannot 
straightforwardly use the tools of linear time series analysis. 
5 DuBois, The English business company, pp. 367-9. 
6 Reproduced in full in app. I. 
7 app. I, lines 12-9.   6
followed in 1720 by the Royal African Company in its own subscription for new 
capital.
8
There was no mechanism described in the Act by which the Company could 
reach into the pockets of defaulting subscribers and extract a call, with interest, as the 
DJT hypothesis would require. As far as the Act was concerned, a defaulter’s liability 
was limited to ‘Shares and Stocks’ that he had already of the Company. The important 
provisions found in the Act are as follows: 
1)  Without the payment of the call, the subscriber would be deprived of any 
‘Share, Dividend, Annuity, or Profits’ that he might otherwise be entitled to;
9 
2)  Without payment of the call, the Company could also ‘stop the Transfers or 
Assignments’ of the defaulter’s interests in the firm;
10 
3)   The defaulter’s liability for a missed payment, plus 5 per cent per annum 
interest, would be met from the ‘Shares and Stocks of such Defaulter’. If the 
subscriber persisted in default for a space of three months, the Company, or 
anyone whom the Company designated, could sell the defaulter’s ‘Stocks’;
11 
4)  Even when the default persisted beyond three months the defaulter could still 
obtain something of value if the sale of his forfeited stock garnered more than 




The language used in 6 Geo. 1, c. 4 therefore is the language of options and 
sanctioned default. Subscribers were not told that they would be forced to comply 
with their subscriptions, nor were they told that their personal estates would be liable 
                                                 
8 DuBois, The English business company, p. 394, n.68. The Royal African Company’s subscription 
issues most recently figured in the study by Carlos, Moyen, and Hill, ‘Royal African Company share 
prices’, although the option-like character of subscription shares was not discussed in that paper. 
9 app. I, lines 27-8. 
10 app. I, lines 33-4.    7
for the missed calls and costs of enforcement. They were handed an option to default 
and the Act tried to make clear only what would be the costs of exercising that option. 
Most importantly, the Act stated explicitly that a defaulter’s liability to the Company 
was limited to his holding of stock in the Company. Not only were subscribers handed 
an option to default, they were also told that the consequences of default were not 
necessarily permanent. As long as they complied within three months, their position 
as members of the Company could be restored. This handed additionally to the 
subscribers what we might call an option ‘to wait and see’. 
Parliamentary bill writers were perfectly capable of writing enforcement 
mechanisms of the kind that DJT presumed existed and could have inserted them into 
6 Geo. 1, c. 4, if they had been required to do so. They could have written language 
that made subscribers’ personal estates liable in actions of debt or actions on the case. 
A good contemporary example of such mechanisms is found in the swingeing 
language of 6 Geo. 1, c. 10 by which the circulation of new Exchequer Bills was 
enforced.
13 The South Sea Company also had a view as to how it would enforce 
subscription contracts. As early as 2 June 1720, there was concern about potential 
default on the second payment of the first subscription (due 14 June). This prompted 
the Company further into its policy of lending money on stock and subscription 
receipts, but in case these measures did not prevent default, defaulters would face the 
simple forfeiture of their first subscription deposit.
14 We also have evidence that 
contemporaries understood readily what the enforcement provisions of 6 Geo. 1, c. 4 
implied for the money subscription contracts. One example is the introductory text to 
one of Archibald Hutcheson’s many tracts, to wit, 
                                                                                                                                            
11 app. I, lines 35-44. 
12 app. I, line 45. 
13 app. I, lines 53-67. 
14 Minute book of the committee of the treasury, HLRO B64, p. 17.   8
It is very certain, that the Proprietors of the Four Money Subscriptions, will 
rather choose to submit to the Forfeitures (which they are liable to, and which the 
Company may exact) than comply with the remaining Payments. And in this Case the 
Proprietors of the Third and Fourth Money Subscriptions, will forfeit all the Money 
by them paid in; having only made their First Payment. The Proprietors of the First 
and Second Subscriptions will forfeit their First Payments, and be intitled to Stock for 
the further payments they have made;
15
 
What then is the DJT view on these matters? DJT write in such a way to suggest 
to the reader that the meaning of much of their terminology should be self evident. 
Phrases like ‘legally enforceable’, ‘legally binding’ and ‘legally valid’ are used 
liberally, but without definition.
16 With regard to the subscription contracts DJT state, 
for example, ‘If these were not legally enforceable, purchasers of subscriptions might 
simply walk away from their obligations, in effect treating their contracts as options.’ 
The words ‘simply walk away’ clearly show that DJT want the reader to think that 
default could not be legally sanctioned, yet this was precisely what 6 Geo. 1, c. 4 
allowed. DJT continue with, ‘However, there can be no doubt about the legally 
binding status of subscriptions, since in early 1720 Parliament initiated legislation that 
was specifically designed to ensure that any subscription issue made by the South Sea 
Company would be legally valid, and transferable by simple legal assignment’. The 
reader might think that DJT are referring to the legislation relevant to enforcement, 6 
Geo. 1, c. 4. But no, DJT are referring actually to 6 Geo.1, c.18 – the Bubble Act. The 
only words in that Act relevant to the subscription shares (which DJT quote) are ‘all 
such subscriptions ( … ) shall be firm and valid’. There is no further explanation in 
the Bubble Act of what ‘firm and valid’ means. The only possible guidance would be 
6 Geo. 1, c. 4 itself. Indeed the Bubble Act appears simply to affirm that the 
                                                 
15 Hutcheson, Some computations and remarks relating to the subscribers, p. 3. Hutcheson clearly 
understood that the Company would impose forfeitures starting with any deposit payments subscribers 
had made. cf. fn. 14. Hutcheson made a similar statement  (September 1720) in An estimate of the 
value of South-Sea Stock, p. 86 (Item 15) in A collection of calculations and remarks. Another 
contemporary statement about possible forfeitures on the subscription shares is found in the anonymous 
Objections against the new scheme for restoring publick credit, abstracted in Boyer, The political state 
of Great Britain, Vol. 21, February 1721, p. 127.   9
provisions of 6 Geo 1.c. 4 will remain ‘firm and valid’ and this was precisely how 
contemporaries understood the meaning of the Bubble Act.  In citing the Bubble Act 
in the context of enforcement mechanisms, however, DJT give the impression that the 
Bubble Act was describing what these enforcement mechanisms were. This was 
simply not the case; the mechanisms were described in the earlier Act – 6 Geo. 1, c. 4. 
17
The mechanisms embodied in 6 Geo.1, c. 4 were not particularly different from 
the mechanisms used throughout the eighteenth century (and later) to encourage 
compliance with the terms of subscription agreements.
18 DuBois writes of the tender 
care that canal companies took in the 1790s to cajole and to work with, but rarely to 
threaten, their subscribing capitalists who were in default on calls.
19 Why was 
enforcement of subscription contracts designed typically to be ‘gentle’? The question 
touches upon the issue of why subscription finance was resorted to in the first place in 
the eighteenth century. In a time when shares were large in nominal size and new 
finance was likely to be constrained in supply, subscription contracts appealed (gently) 
to a class of financiers who might not otherwise be able or willing to buy complete 
shares outright.
20 After all, if a company wished to raise large-scale financing from 
credit-constrained financiers, a simple alternative means would have been to make 
public offerings of smaller fractional shares, but in the eighteenth century companies 
                                                                                                                                            
16 DJT, pp. 257-8. 
17 This is demonstrated fully in app. II. The Act additionally provided for the transferability via 
endorsement of subscription receipts, a provision thought by some especially necessary to attract 
potential subscribers. cf. fn. 20. In app. II it is shown that the passages in the Bubble Act concerning 
subscriptions were also the products of a general concern about the legality of the Company’s 
subscriptions. 
18 Even the Bubble Act contains an example of such enforcement mechanisms relevant to how the 
London Assurance and the Royal Exchange Assurance could raise further capital from their 
shareholders. In 1720 the Royal African Company’s subscription contracts were subject to similar 
enforcement provisions. See NA T70/101, Minutes of the general court, pp. 201-2. cf. fn. 8. 
19 DuBois, The English business company, p. 369. 
20 There is some 1720 testimony that the demand for subscriptions came from such people. ‘For many 
Persons, who were to follow the King to Hanover, and others, were hard put to it, to make their second 
payment to the first Subscription, were both equally desirous to turn their Stock into Money’. (Boyer, 
The political state of Great Britain, Vol. 19, June 1720, p. 656.) The anonymous writer of An abstract 
of the case of the subscribers says that ‘forasmuch few Subscribers were able to pay more than the first   10
rarely did this.
21 After hypothesising that original and subscription shares were 
precisely ‘equivalent’, it is indeed curious that DJT did not then raise the question as 
to why the subscription shares were issued at all. 
Even if 6 Geo. 1, c. 4 had never permitted default, there were other reasons for 
which thinking individuals could have viewed the completion of the subscription 
contracts as being optional. These reasons were put forth, rebutted and defended in a 
lively debate that certainly commenced as early as September 1720 and continued into 
1722. Some of the issues debated even predated the crisis in South Sea share values. 
In their terse assertion of supposedly inviolable enforcement provisions of the 
subscription contracts, DJT mentioned no such debate and indeed gave the impression 
that any controversy was settled unequivocally by a House of Commons resolution of 
the 19 December 1720.
22 But such was not the case. The debate probably served to 
lower the costs of default to subscription share owners and raised thereby the value of 
default options already embedded in the subscription contracts. DJT not only ignored 
this debate and its implications for how people viewed the subscription shares, but 
they also excluded from their analysis data coming from this most important period. 
This and other aspects of DJT’s handling of data are examined in the next section. 
III. 
South Sea share value data are very scarce and Bubble historians should have some 
very good reasons for excluding any amount of the available data from their analysis. 
DJT have actually left out a large proportion of the available data from their analysis, 
which happened to be the data most unfavourable to their thesis. In the course of 
excluding this data, DJT were left with data that spanned an approximate four-month 
(15 May - 27 September) period. In two of those four months (23 June - 22 August) 
                                                                                                                                            
Payment, unless they had been enabled by Parliament to sell and assign the same (i.e. the subscription 
receipts)’. 
21 This is what the Hudson’s Bay Company did in 1720, but it was exceptional (DuBois, p. 357).   11
the Company’s share transaction ledgers were closed. In that period, when spot 
transaction values for shares were not available in the historical record, DJT choose to 
approximate those values.
23 The approximation method chosen was instrumental in 
creating an appearance that subscription share values were less than original share 
values. DJT considered this appearance as very favourable to their hypothesis, but it 
will be shown that the approximation method used was hardly an appropriate one to 
employ on 1720 financial data. It will be demonstrated that counterparty risk in 
forward financial contracting during the South Sea Bubble was very large. If such risk 
is not taken into account, it is very easy to overstate grossly the spot values of original 
shares, as DJT have done. 
DJT wrote briefly on the question of reliability of data sources and their 
conclusions are for most all purposes correct – there are, for most purposes, no 
appreciable differences between data from Freke
24 or Castaing
25 that would make one 
source of data preferable to the other.
26 From the available Freke data, DJT chose to 
use only the values between 14 May and 27 September inclusive. For dates prior to 14 
May, the Directors’ trades (sales) of first and second subscription shares are adequate 
sources for extending the record of values.
27 Figures 1 and 2 show clearly the data 
(‘DJT excluded’) that are omitted from DJT’s figure 1. 
What is important is not so much the early 1720 figures that were excluded, but 
the later 1720 figures for the first and second subscriptions. Why did DJT exclude the 
latter data? The only statement we have for it is, 
                                                                                                                                            
22 DJT, fn. 72. 
23 DJT do not seem to be aware that the ledgers were quickly closed again (26 August) and remained 
shut until 12 September, and thus they make no forward-to-spot adjustments to data in that period. See 
the analysis in supp. app. III, cf. fn. 59. 
24 Freke, The prices of several stocks, but hereafter referred to as Prices of stocks. 
25 Castaing, The course. 
26 supp. app. III, conclusion A.III.1. 
27 supp. app. III, conclusion A.III.2 and A.III.3. DJT do use some early reported values from A true 
state of the contracts.   12
( … ) their value for this study is questionable, since towards the end of 
September the South Sea Company began to consider proposals for remedial 
action involving retrospective adjustment of the last two subscription prices ( … ) 
A cut-off point of 27 September is used to allow for possible anticipation of 
such action, which may have led to some distortion in subscription prices.
28
 
The full scope of this ‘possible anticipation’ is discussed in appendix II. Of 
course the markets for subscription shares were full of anticipations of what 
alterations might be made, not only in the terms of the subscription agreements, but in 
their continuing validity. Such ‘distortions’ are the stuff of history and should not 
result automatically in scarce data being discarded. 
One consequence of excluding the post-September data is that it allowed DJT to 
write, with little risk of contradiction, ‘( … ) there is no evidence of a widening gap 
between stock valuations and those of subscription two as the share price fell to levels 
below the amount of calls outstanding late in September’.
29 Perhaps there is no such 
evidence as long as one is not looking for it into October 1720 or beyond. The DJT-
excluded data are subscription share values from periods in which South Sea share 
values were relatively low – precisely the periods in which default options embedded 
in subscription contracts would have had their greatest value and the periods in which 
we would expect to find a ‘widening gap’ in values. As South Sea share prices fell 
precipitously in September, they approached and fell below the level of the issue 
prices of the first two subscriptions (£300 per share and £400 per share, respectively) 
and the default options embedded in the subscriptions would steadily have become 
more valuable. The debate surrounding the subscriptions would have been corrosive 
to the goodwill the Company needed from the public and the government to prevent 
                                                 
28 DJT, p. 242. Neither Freke nor Castaing report any post-September values for subscriptions three or 
four in any case. There are however post-September values for the first two subscriptions in both 
sources. 
29 Ibid., p. 258. This particular DJT conclusion was also aided by their use of data from Freke.  
Castaing’s data tell a different story. See supp. app. III, conclusion A.III.3.   13
defaults. Indeed, as share values fell, the Company became actually supine in its 
demands for cash instalment payments. This may have very well signalled to the   14
Figure 1. South Sea original and 1st. subscription share values, 1720








































































Figure 2. South Sea original and 2nd. subscription share values, 1720
                2nd. sub. values (Freke)                    Original share values (Freke)         2nd. sub. values (HLRO)
Source: Freke, Prices of stocks and HLRO Box 158 (see text supp. app. III)
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Support for these views is certainly much stronger when the DJT-excluded data are 
viewed alongside the data that appear in DJT’s figure 1 and the potential for 
discovering a nonlinear pricing relationship of the type discussed in section I is 
enhanced.
30
We now turn to another significant aspect of DJT’s data handling. Nearly 60 
percent of the data DJT analysed came from the periods in which the Company’s 
share transaction ledgers were closed.
31 The only values for shares reported both by 
Freke and Castaing were values for forward delivery ‘for the opening’.
32 The 
investigator must work backward from that data to some approximate values for 
‘spot’ trade. How that is done will determine the level of imputed spot prices in the 23 
June - 22 August period. 
The method that DJT use to calculate these imputed values is very simple; they 
discount the reported forward values from Freke with a 5 per cent per annum discount 
rate. This does not mean that their imputed spot values are 5 per cent below the 
reported Freke values. The 5 per cent per annum rate is applied over only the time left 
to the opening of the transfer ledgers or, at most, two months. So, for example, on 23 
June when Freke reports a forward value of £1000 per share, DJT would impute a 
spot value for shares on that date of about £1000/(1 + .05/360)
60 = £991.70, less than 
1 per cent below the reported £1000 forward value.
33 In other words, DJT’s imputed 
                                                 
30 cf. fn. 4. 
31 Between 15 May and 27 September there were only 113 (Freke) observations of South Sea original 
share values. 66 of these observations come from the closed-ledgers periods. 
32 This would have been generally understood to be the dates 22/23 August as far as the midsummer 
closing period was concerned. We do not know what Freke or Castaing were reporting in the second 
closing period. Presumably they were similar forward delivery values for the opening, which was 
announced to be 21 September, but was changed to 12 September in a snap decision made on 11 
September. See the analysis in supp. app. III, cf. fn. 59. 
33 The 5% p.a. assumption employed here by DJT was also employed by Dale in The first crash. 
Exception to this assumption (for the purpose of calculating values for PVcalls) has been taken by Neal 
in his review of Dale’s monograph (Neal, ‘Book review of The first crash’). We review this 
controversy at the end of supp. app. IV.   16
spot values hardly differ from the forward values reported by Freke. This has a 
noticeable impact upon some of their conclusions, for example,  
 
 ( … ) if subscriptions were treated as options by investors, they should certainly 
not sell at a discount relative to stock. Yet subscriptions one and two traded at a 
discount on the share price for 41.6 per cent and 37.2 per cent of the period 
covered by the analysis ( … ).
34
 
What DJT neglected to inform the reader of in this passage is that these supposed 
discounts can be observed only in periods in which the Company’s transfer ledgers 
were closed, as a glance back to figures 1 and 2 will readily confirm. By assuming 
that forward premia were very nearly zero, DJT obtained approximate spot values for 
shares that were as high as they could possibly have been and making consequently 
original share values appear as if they were in excess of subscription values. And, of 
course, in not calculating any forward premia for the second closing period (26 
August – 12 September), DJT treat the Freke data as if they were spot value data, 
which they were probably not. To all intents and purposes, DJT have imputed spot 
values for South Sea shares as if the South Sea forwards were traded on a modern 
futures exchange, in which most all counterparty risk is eliminated. Such forward 
values today are understandably referred to as ‘zero-premium forwards’. DJT were 
thus dismissive of the notion that the peak in South Sea share values was much lower 
and earlier than they depict, but they did not look for evidence to the contrary.
35
The forward premium, the difference between a forward price and a 
contemporaneous spot value for the same asset, can have potentially several different 
components. Only a few of these components should be strongly influenced by levels 
                                                 
34 DJT, pp. 257-8. 
35 Neal , The rise of financial capitalism, pp. 101 and 111, conjectured that the peak in South Sea share 
values was much lower than was conventionally depicted. He based his argument on inspections of 
spot values for other shares besides those of the South Sea Company. Again in Neal, ‘Book review of 
The first crash’ he mentions the possibility that forward premia might have been as large as 50% at the 
end of June 1720. His original conjecture was probably correct and, as we discuss at the end of this 
section, an estimated 50% forward premia might have even been conservative.   17
of interest rates. Forward premia might be large because there are additional cost or 
risk components in forward contracts. An intriguing possibility is to consider whether 
South Sea shares themselves carried a convenience yield. There were many actions 
taken by the Company’s Directors that were attempts to control the number of shares 
outstanding in the markets. Some of these actions have been interpreted as attempts to 
create a controllable scarcity in tradable shares.
36 Indeed, the schemes for converting 
much of the national debt into South Sea shares could have generated some 
uncertainty about future inventories of stock. In the face of such uncertainty, the 
convenience of having shares in hand could have had some value. Other components 
of forward prices would likely have to be attributed to counterparty risk. Counterparty 
risk can take a number of forms, but in the context of forward delivery agreements 
there are two basic types: a) When Party A contracts to deliver stock forward to Party 
B for a fixed price, Party A faces the risk that Party B will not accept delivery and will 
withhold payment and, b) on the other hand, Party B faces the risk that Party A will 
not deliver the stock or will not accept the promised fixed-price payment as adequate. 
When considered along with the possibility of a convenience yield, it becomes a very 
interesting question (and, ultimately, an empirical question) as to how large and with 
what sign a forward premium appears. How this question is answered should 
determine the method by which spot values can be imputed from forward values. 
Such questions simply do not hold any interest for DJT. Why did DJT not 
consider a possible role for counterparty risk when they calculated imputed spot 
values for shares? This is a puzzle because it is clear that they believed in 
counterparty risk in this context.  
                                                 
36 This was what some pamphleteers wrote about (app. II, table 1, col. 8) when they complained of 
being robbed of the ‘chance of the market’. The failure to deliver subscription receipts was a particular 
sore point with such writers. Some writers also complained of what they perceived to be the arbitrary 
and overly lengthy closures of the share transfer ledgers.   18
In addition, subscription receipts were subject to settlement risk because they 
were deferred contracts in which the counter-party might fail, whereas stock 




So, it is not as if DJT did not believe in possible counterparty risk; they appeared to be 
simply incurious about its direction and size.
38
To obtain direct measurements of forward premia, we would have to observe 
forward values and spot values for the same dates. Such is not to be had for the 23 
June – 22 August period, of course, but some data can be had from outside of that 
period. The data have to come from actual forward delivery contracts or from records 
that refer to such contracts. One place to look for such contracts is amongst the private 
papers of individuals who were known to be active forward traders. No one was more 
notorious for such trade than was Henry, the first Duke of Portland. Amongst the 
fairly large number of forward agreements that the Duke made between April and 
December 1720, there were a number made from early May right up to 23 June in 
which he agreed to take delivery of South Sea shares upon the opening of transfer 
books in late August. The measured forward premia that were imbedded in Portland’s 
forward contracts were very large. For some weeks before the closing of the transfer 
books his forward contracts for South Sea stock were clearly as expensive as were the 
contract values reported by Freke and Castaing in midsummer. The smallest forward 
premium recorded in this data is 77 per cent per annum and the largest is 216 per cent 
per annum.
39 The average forward premium in the two weeks prior to the closing of 
the books was about 115 per cent per annum. Now it might be objected that these are 
too large to reflect typical counterparty risk premia. The Duke was a notoriously 
                                                 
37 DJT, p. 257. 
38 In supp. app. III it is also argued that DJT failed to discuss the size of forward premia embodied in 
the ‘regular’ and ‘for money’ third subscription values.  See conclusions A.III.4 and A.III.5. 
39 These contracts are variously found in classes Pl and Pw in the Portland (London) manuscript 
collections, University of Nottingham.   19
bullish supporter of the Company and it might be argued that the high forward values 
for which he was willing to write contracts reflected only his unique assessment of the 
future value of South Sea shares. There are several problems with this argument. He 
was writing contracts with some of his friends and advisors who were known to be as 
bullish on the South Sea scheme as he was bullish.
40 After the collapse of the Bubble, 
he proved himself highly capable of reneging on his contracts. Being from the highest 
ranks of the aristocracy, Portland had at his disposal considerable legal and political 
resources, few of which could be matched by the other parties to his contracts. It 
might be argued that rational forward sellers might have demanded especially large 
forward premia from the Duke. An added complication is that his contracts were 
laden with extra provisions that were designed to encourage performance from both 
contracting parties. He was used to binding his counterparties to perform on the 
contracts by having them state that he (Portland) was the actual owner of the stock 
(which he sometimes was) and they were but trustees of the stock they were 
promising to deliver to him. Portland too would bind himself more strongly to 
performance by giving securities and stating that amounts promised to be paid were 
but loans from the forward seller. The contracts also specified typically severe 
penalties (‘penal sums’ as they were called) for non-performance by either party. A 
study of actual forward financial contracts, such as the Duke’s, reveals that financial 
contract writers used a wide array of means for dealing with counterparty risk. Even 
when such risk-management devices were deployed, the apparent forward premia in 
speculative contracts could still be huge. 
In figure 3 is illustrated some of the summary information we have concerning 
the size of forward delivery premia in 1720. Prices for the forward delivery of third 
                                                 
40 Sir John Meres – lawyer and advisor - was a counterparty to the Duke’s contracts. He was the author 
of the Equity of parliaments, a defence against Swift’s attacks on the South Sea scheme. Another 
counterparty was Sir George Caswall, partner in the Swordblade Bank, the South Sea Company’s bank.   20
subscription receipts (what DJT  call ‘regular’ prices) are depicted and they also are of 
considerable size relative to prices ‘for money’, the latter being the spot price for the 
promise of a third subscription receipt.
41 The Portland values for forward delivery of 
original shares are also depicted. The figure also illustrates the result of an exercise in 
which the smallest percentage forward premium found in the Duke’s contracts (77 per 
cent per annum) is used to calculate some hypothetical spot original share values 
during the midsummer closing of the Company’s transfer ledgers.
42  Without adding 
further clutter to figure 3, the reader can readily confirm that such hypothetical spot 
values would quite easily be below the values of either the first or second subscription 
displayed in figures 1 and 2. We might think of these hypothetical spot values as a 
kind of maximum lower bound on spot values in the midsummer period, whereas it is 
better to think of the DJT-imputed spot values as constituting an upper bound on spot 
values. 
In this section the following has been shown: 
a)  A high proportion of available values for the first and second subscriptions 
were excluded from the DJT analysis. Rather than being ‘distorted’, these data came 
from periods in which either South Sea share values were relatively low (spring  and 
autumn 1720) or from periods in which the subscription contracts were highly 
controversial (autumn 1720). Values for subscription shares clearly exceeded original 
share values in these periods, particularly in the autumn of 1720. 
b)  A high proportion of the share values that DJT used came from periods in 
which the Company transfer ledgers were closed. In these periods original share spot 
values were estimated as if they were approximately equal to forward prices. Forward 
                                                 
41 supp. app. III. conclusion A.III.5. 
42 In this exercise we make an assumption that a forward premium was dissipated smoothly until it 
disappeared just before the date of forward delivery. This assumption was not necessary. Very large 
forward delivery premia could have persisted right up to the moment the delivery occurred and then 
disappeared all at once.   21
premia were effectively assumed to be zero, even in the acknowledged presence of 
counterparty risk. Direct measurements of forward premia show that counterparty risk 
was not only present, but its effects on forward values in 1720 were very probably 
huge. In consequence of this, spot values for shares were probably far below 
contemporaneous forward delivery values. We conclude that the selection, 
presentation and adjustment of data by DJT were unjustified historically and just 
happened to cast inequality 2 in the worst possible light. 
 
 IV. 
History shows how people have confronted problems and, in their attempts to solve 
them, have contributed something to the making of the modern world. In other words, 
one of the uses of history is that it helps us to understand ‘how we got from there to 
here’. There are other uses for history as well. Many believe that there are certain 
lessons from history that are timeless, lessons that are just as relevant in the year 2006 
as they were relevant in 1720. No doubt history can teach us some of these valuable 
lessons, but when pushed far enough, a historical analysis can be shaped to illustrate 
whatever ‘timeless’ lesson needs to be learned. Garber warns us that the historical 
bubble literature is full of such lessons that some writers feel that we need to be taught. 
He warns that ‘History is a rhetorical weapon to be used in influencing modern policy 
outcomes’ and that historical bubbles can be the perfect ‘dream events for those who 
want to control the flow of capital’.
43 So, what lessons do DJT want us to learn from 
their history? ‘These findings underline the important role that irrationality may play 
in stock markets and suggest that today’s policymakers may need to counteract the 
potentially damaging effects of irrational pricing of financial assets’.
44 This is a good 
                                                 
43 Garber, Famous first bubbles, p. 12. 
44 DJT, p. 233.   22
                                                
deal more than simply learning ‘how we got from there to here’. Perhaps we had 
better make sure that the foundations of the lesson are sound. 
The soundest lessons that can be drawn from ‘Financial markets can go mad’ are 
about three in number. First, if you wish to demonstrate that financial contracts are 
irrationally priced, do not look too closely into the legal framework that governs those 
contracts. Second, your financial market analysis should not stray towards an 
examination of peoples’ opinions and attitudes with regard to the contracts and law. 
Third, the financial analyst should not allow a complete presentation of data to cloud 
any conclusions that can be supported by only a specially selected and adjusted subset 
of the data. In 1938 DuBois outlined the typical features of eighteenth-century 
corporate subscription share finance. Nearly 70 years afterward, we now have to 
rediscover that his research would have been the most useful starting point for an 
investigation into South Sea subscription finances, a starting point from which DJT’s 
historical lessons would have been very hard to discover. 
The subscription contracts and their pricing do have much to teach us about the 
events of 1720, but the lessons may never support the idea that there was widespread 
irrationality in the markets for South Sea shares, an idea which not so long ago was 
accorded mythic status by Hoppit.
45 South Sea original shares and subscription shares 
were fundamentally different securities in law and in the minds of financially and 
politically astute individuals in 1720. But now these persons have been dragged back 
into the dock to face the most drearily familiar of charges: they are ‘prone to fits of 
mania’, their ‘excitement levels have risen to destructive levels’ and, worst of all, they 
are guilty of the ‘widespread use of heuristics’.
46 As long as it can be shown that
 
45 Hoppit, ‘The myths of the South Sea Bubble’, p. 145. 
46 DJT, p. 263. Figure 3. Some South Sea forward delivery premia, 1720
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the people of 1720 had an interest in the contemporary law and the working of 
markets, an interest that was livelier than that possessed by their twenty-first-century 
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Appendix I: Enforcement provisions from Acts of Parliament in 1720 
 
Concerning Additional South Sea Stock and instalments – the passage from 
6 George 1, c. 4 (April 1720) 
 
And for the better enabling the said Governor and Company of Merchants of Great 
Britain, and their Successors, to raise Money to be Paid, for or in part of the said Sum 
of Four million one hundred fifty six thousand three hundred and six Pounds, four 
Shillings, and Eleven Pence, or for or in part of the said Sums to be paid after the said 
Rates of Four Years and an half Purchase, and One Years Purchase respectively, or 
for Purchasing or Paying off all or any the Annuities and Debts to be taken in or paid 
off in pursuance of this Act, or for exchanging for Ready Money the New Exchequer 
Bills to be made forth, as hereafter in this Act is mentioned, or for defraying the 
Interest thereof, or for carrying on their Trade, and other necessary Occasions: Be it 
further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That it shall and may be Lawful to and for 
the said Governor and Company of Merchants of Great Britain, and their Successors, 
from time to time, as they shall see cause, to call in or direct to be paid from and by 
their respective Members for the time being, proportionably according to their 
respective Interests in the Capital stock or Stocks which do or shall belong to the said 
Governor and Company of Merchants of Great Britain, and which shall be increased, 
as aforesaid, or by Opening Books of Subscription, or by Granting Annuities 
redeemable by the same Governor and Company, and their Successors, or by any 
other Method, Ways, and Means as they shall think proper to raise any Sum or Sums 
of Money, as in a General Court of the same Governor and Company shall, from time 
to time, be judged necessary, and ordered to be called in, or raised; and that all 
Executors, Administrators, Guardians, Trustees, and Mortgagees, shall be indemnified 
in paying, and are hereby impowered to pay in their respective Proportions of the 
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or Neglect to pay his, her or their Share of the said Money so called for that Purpose, 
by Notice inserted in the London Gazette, and fixed upon the Royal Exchange in 
London, It shall and may be Lawful to and for the said Governor and Company of 
Merchants of Great Britain, and their Successors, not only to stop the Share, Dividend, 
Annuity, and Profits, which shall, from time to time, become payable to such Member 
or Members so neglecting or refusing, of the Funds, Stocks, Annuities, or Profits of 
the said Governor and Company of Merchants of Great Britain, and to apply the same, 
from time to time, for or towards Payment of the Share of the Money so called for, 
and which ought to have been paid by such member or Members, so neglecting or 
Refusing, until the same shall be satisfied, but also to stop the Transfers or 
Assignments of the Share and Shares of every such Defaulter and Defaulters with 
Interest, after the Rate of Five Pounds per Centum per Annum, for the Money so by 
him, her or them omitted to be paid, from the time the same was appointed to be paid 
until the Payment thereof; and that the Share and Stock, Shares and Stocks of such 
Defaulter and Defaulters shall be liable to make good and answer the said Monies so 
appointed to be paid, and the Interest thereof, as aforesaid; and in case the Principal 
and Interest, as aforesaid shall be unpaid by the space of Three Months, then the said 
Governor and Company of Merchants of Great Britain, or their Successors, or their 
Court of Directors for the time being, shall have Power to Authorize such Person or 
Persons as they shall think fit, to Sell, Assign, and Transfer so much of the said Stock 
or Stocks of such Defaulter or Defaulters as will satisfy and pay the same, rendring 
the Overplus (if any be) to the Proprietor; And the said Governor and Company of 
Merchants of Great Britain, or their Successors, in a General Court, from time to time, 
when they shall judge their Affairs will admit thereof, shall or may cause any sum or 
Sums of Money which shall be called in, or any Part thereof, to be divided and 
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proportion to their respective Interests in the Capital Stock or Stocks of the same; And 




















Concerning circulation of Exchequer bills – the passage from 6 George 1, c. 
10 (June 1720) 
 
(i)n case any such Receiver or Collector shall refuse or neglect to exchange such Bills 
for ready Money by the Space of Twenty-four hours, then the Person or Persons 
demanding the same, shall or may bring an Action of Debt, or on the Case, for the 
Principal and Interest Monies due upon such Bill or Bills, against such Receiver or 
Collector having Money in his Hands, as aforesaid, in which Action the Plaintiff shall 
or may declare, that such Receiver or Collector is indebted to such Plaintiff in the 
Money demanded upon every such Bill according to the form of the Statute, and hath 
not paid the same, which shall be sufficient, and the Plaintiff in every such Action 
shall recover against the Receiver or Collector, not only the Monies so refused or 
neglected to be paid, but also his Damages besides full Costs of Suit, and such 
Receiver or Collector shall be subject and liable thereunto; And in such Action no 
Essoign, Protection, Privilege or Wager of Law shall be allowed, or more than one 
Imparlance; and upon Payment of the Monies to be recovered, the Plaintiff, his 
Executors, or Assigns shall deliver up such Bills to the defendant, his Executors or 
Assigns. 
 
Appendix II: The contemporary legal and political debate on the subscription 
contracts 
This debate has a prominent place in the primary South Sea literature. The 
literature covers a range of topics such as the doubtful legality of the first two 
subscription issues, the South Sea Company being in breach of its own obligations 
under the subscription contracts, the suspected and proven frauds perpetrated by the   29
Directors and the latter necessity for Parliamentary intervention. In this appendix we 
seek simply to demonstrate the existence of the debate, its contemporary importance 
and, finally, its lack of resolution in 1720. 
There is an old controversy about the limits to which the South Sea Company 
could raise new financing. The possible illegality of the first two money subscriptions 
is a subtheme that runs through the controversy. In his authoritative history of the 
Bubble Act. Harris concluded that it would be safe to assume that contemporaries saw 
the increase in the Company’s financing via public money subscriptions as 
controversial and perhaps of doubtful legality. One of the objects of the Bubble Act 




49 have argued that in the period prior to the Bubble Act the Company was 
treading on uncertain legal ground. Although 6 Geo.1, c. 4 allowed the Company to 
issue at least some additional stock to finance the purchase of government annuities 
and debts, the total amount of additional stock issuable was tied to the amount of 
government debt that the Company could obtain. It was thus not clear that issuing 
additional stock in order to start the Company’s programmes for obtaining 
government debts was legal. Although DJT made much of the fact that, with the 
Bubble Act, ‘there can be no doubt about the legally binding status of subscriptions 
(… ),’ they neglected to inform the reader that nevertheless much doubt persisted in 
contemporary minds.
50
Even if the public’s qualms about the legality of the subscription issues had been 
settled by the Bubble Act, it quickly became apparent that the Company’s subsequent 
                                                 
47 Harris, Industrializing English law, p. 68. 
48 Scott, The finance and constitution of joint-stock companies, Vol. 3, p.308. 
49 Neal, The rise of financial capitalism, p. 97, fn. 14. 
50 DJT, p. 257. In Considerations on the present state of the nation (anonymous, abstracted in Boyer, 
The political state of Great Britain, Vol. 20, p. 547) the author asserts there was never any sanction for 
money subscriptions in Acts for the South Sea Company. Although patently false, this was a sentiment 
credible enough or widespread enough for Boyer to include it in his summary of events and opinions 
for November 1720.   30
behaviour towards subscribers would become cavalier. Suppliers of new finance may 
have required some reassurance that their monies would be well spent and this is why 
financing Acts, such as 6 Geo. 1, c. 4, were expected to specify a list of permitted uses 
for new funds.
51 As long as South Sea stock values were riding high, the Company 
was not even at pains to disguise the extra-contractual and unequal treatment it meted 
out to different subscribers. For example, the Company’s Committee of Treasury 
determined that owners of the first subscription could possibly forfeit their deposit 
payments if they did not meet the second instalment due on 14 June,
52 but at the same 
time many participants in the third subscription did not make the required deposit 
payment for their subscriptions. No secret was made of this state of affairs, for it was 
openly discussed in a Committee of the Directors in late July 1720.
53The most 
controversial behaviour on the part of the Company, however, was the application of 
subscription financing to uses other than those permitted under 6 Geo. 1, c. 4. As 
monies from the first two subscriptions started to come in, it was declared that the 
new financing would be used largely to support the Company’s stock by lending the 
money back to shareholders and subscribers
54
The debate about the validity of the subscription contracts reached its height in 
late 1720. Critics were emboldened by the continuing follies in South Sea financial 
management and the obvious decline in political support for the Company. There was 
an apparent increase in the flow of pamphlets in which the themes were the 
Company’s failure in its public duties and its contractual duties to subscribers. There 
were, of course, some writers who recognised no such responsibilities for the 
Company so that the opinion in speeches and in pamphlets covered a wide range of 
                                                 
51 app. I, lines 1-10. 
52 cf. fn. 14. 
53 Boyer, The political state of Great Britain, Vol. 20, p. 132. A £100 deposit was required upon 
subscription, BL Add. MS 25,499, 15 June 1720.   31
views that persisted, in disagreement, for a long time after 1720. Whatever it means 
precisely when DJT write that people in 1720 were ‘aware of the enforcement issue’
55 
is difficult to fathom, but it gives the impression that people were actually in 
agreement about the continued validity of the subscription contracts and the 
enforcement provisions that DJT presumed were in place. There was actually a 
vociferous debate about whether the subscription contracts themselves were any 
longer valid. 
Bringing the pamphlet literature into some sort of order is quite difficult. It was 
an era of vanity publishing and anonymous polemical works that were commissioned 
for fees. Writers’ arguments were sometimes blatantly self-serving, but in other cases 
writers tried to make arguments balance on both sides of an issue. Some writing was 
precise, but much was written that was incoherent in style and logic. To bring some 
order to the plethora of contemporary pamphlets, table 1 presents a classification 
system for a selection of pamphlets whose subjects were most closely concerned with 
the money subscription contracts. In this table are listed the most commonly 
encountered questions regarding subscription contracts and the writers’ brief opinions 
regarding them. Although the number of writings could be expanded from the 
eighteen listed, the selection at least contains opinions from one end of the spectrum 
to the other on any particular question. The pamphlets considered a large number of 
questions, but the most important are the following three: 
 
1) Are the Public’s subscription contracts with the Company null and void? This 
could have been answered in the affirmative if the writer thought the contracts 
never had validity, or if the answer to the next question was affirmative. 
 
2) Is the South Sea Company in breach of its subscription contractual 
obligations? The writer could presume that the subscription contracts were valid 
at one time, but because of the Directors’ misbehaviour with regard to the use of 
                                                                                                                                            
54 BL Add. MS 25,499, Court minutes, 21 April 1720, p. 140. The only possible sanction for such a use 
of funds could have been found in a catchall phrase of the Act. See app. I, line 9. 
55 DJT, p. 257.   32
subscription finance, their inequitable treatment of subscribers, or their 
unilateral alteration of the terms of the contracts, the contracts no longer had 
legal standing. If either question 1 or 2 was answered in the affirmative, then the 
next question was raised usually. 
 
3) Are private financial bargains based upon subscription contracts null and void? 
The problem addressed here was whether the Company was a culpable third 
party who prevented one or both parties in a private financial contract from 
performing their part of the bargain. 
  
The rest of the questions in the table are ancillary to the first three. That is, they 
concern possible reasons why the subscription contracts or private bargains based on 
them were invalid or reasons why the Company was in breach of its contracts. There 
are also questions that concern the consequences and subsequent actions that should 
be taken with regard to the subscription contracts. In question 4 the issue concerned 
whether the public should be exposed to the full rigours of their private contractual 
obligations. Was the public the victim of the duplicitous actions of the South Sea 
Directors or not? Would it be in the public interest to wind back all private contractual 
positions to those of some earlier state? Could the South Sea Company itself do it 
unilaterally by altering the terms of the subscription agreements? This was question 5. 
Did the Company’s contracts with the public have the same standing as private 
contracts in law, or were they contracts between the government and the public, only 
meditated by the Company in trust? If the latter was true, was not Parliamentary 
intervention required to regulate the contracts between the Company and the public 
(question 6)?  Were the interests of the public now best served by the Company 
delivering the receipts for the third and fourth subscriptions (question 7)? Even 
though the Company had a private obligation to subscribers to deliver the receipts, 
perhaps a wider public interest argued against it. Could the Company make such 
decisions unilaterally without breaching its private duties and thereby relieving 
subscribers of their obligations to fulfil their end of the subscription bargains? Was   33
not the Company already in breach of its contracts with the public with its high-
handed behaviour: shutting the transaction ledgers for long periods, then 
opening/shutting them again, apparently at whim, and failing to deliver subscription 
receipts in a timely fashion, thereby denying share owners of what some writers called 
‘the chance of the market’ (question 8)?
56 Finally, the writers had a full range of 
opinions of the character and performance of the Directors and their fitness (question 
9). 
This printed literature is thus evidence for a wide range of dispute about both the 
initial and continued legality of the subscription contracts. The disputes continued into 
the Parliamentary debates. Parliament was due to reconvene on 25 November 1720, 
but was delayed from meeting until the 8 December while it waited for a report and a 
financial recovery plan from Robert Walpole. On 19 December Walpole wished to 
know if, before he presented his plans, he could trust that the House would not do 
anything to change the standing of subscription contracts. He could not have asked 
this for the sake of achieving constancy in these contracts; the Company itself was 
still in the process of changing them and, for example, had still not come to any 
resolution about the disposition of the third and fourth subscription receipts. Indeed, 
the resolution for which Walpole sought consent was a resolution that would say that 
Parliament would not intervene between the Company and subscribers – that disputes 
would be left to privately negotiated resolution or legal action. That this was 
understood to be the practical import of the House’s resolution is amply revealed in 
the pamphlet literature. Parliamentary opposition to Walpole also understood that the 
House resolution would not be the final word on the subscription contracts.  The 
opposition were on the attack the next day (20 December) making forcefully the 
 57
                                                 
56 cf. fn. 36. 
57 My summary of Parliamentary debates and actions taken in 1720-1 depend upon Boyer, The political 
state of Great Britain, Vols. 21-2, 1721.    34
argument once more for an annulling Act. They argued that subscribers were wronged 
by breach of a public trust given to the South Sea Directors by Parliament. Parliament 
therefore was the only reasonable place in which subscribers could seek redress. A 
resolution to that effect was rejected by a large majority. The resolution of 19 
December gave Walpole the time and the room to manoeuvre that he needed to 
manage the Commons and the chartered companies towards his plan for financial 
recovery. 
The political victory for the annulling party came soon after January 1721. The 
reports published by the Committee of Secrecy were too damning to prevent the 
growth of a vengeful ‘country party’ in Parliament. By February, however, Walpole 
was situated so that the politics of vengeance could work in his favour.  The original 
South Sea Directors had been disabled and disenfranchised politically. Their 
government supporters had been discredited and neutralised. There were new 
Directors in place who were eager to wind up the subscriptions in ways that were 
acceptable to Walpole and the other chartered companies. Measures were taken in the 
Company’s General Court on 9 March that would effectively wind up the money 
subscriptions and turn them into conventional South Sea stock. Once it was seen that 
the terms were broadly acceptable, these resolutions became law in 7 Geo. 1, stat 2. 
How the subscription shares were turned into South Sea stock was quite close to what 
the Company itself had proposed back on 30 September 1720. Only in that sense 
could one say that the Commons’ resolution of 19 December 1720 was sustained. In 
December 1720, however, few people understood that when the subscription shares 
finally would disappear, so would the South Sea Company’s pretensions for a large 
role in national financial and political affairs.35
                   
 
Table 1 – Pamphlets and tracts relevant to the money subscription contracts, 1720-1722 
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nr  Y (5-6)  Y (6)              nr nr nr nr nr nr The case of contracts 
nr  Y  nr  Y  nr        nr nr nr N  The case of the purchasers 
nr  N            N N Y nr nr N  nr  The case of the sellers 
N (9-10)  Y (14)  N (9-10)  N        Y nr  N (8-9) nr N (9)  A full confutation 
nr              nr nr nr Y (13) nr nr nr  Y (4-5,14) A letter to a friend 
N (10)  N (12)  N (4,13-14)  N (7)  Y  nr  N  nr  N  The nature of the contracts 
nr  Y              Y Y nr nr nr nr N  Queries 
Y (1,2)  Y (1,2)  Y (3-4)  Y (2)        nr Y (1,3-4) nr Y (2)  N (1,2)  Reasons for making void 
Y (3)  Y (3)  Y (3)  Y (4,5)    nr Y (5)  N (6)  Y (4)  N  Further reasons offer’d 
nr              nr N (1)  N (3) nr N (3-4) nr nr Y (1)  An answer to the reasons 
nr  Y (2)  Y (1-2)  Y (2)  Y (1)  Y (3)  N (1)    nr N (2)  Restitution: a law of the land 
nr  Y (5)  N (14-15)  Y  N (5-7)  Y (23-24)  Y (5)  N (12)    nr A true state of the contracts 
N (9)            nr N (11-12)  N (15-16)  Y (13-14) nr Y (7) nr Y (15)  A vindication of E----ce B-g—l 
N  N (27)           Nr nr nr nr nr nr Y  Blunt, A true state 
nr                  nr Nr nr Y (4) nr nr nr N (4) Budgell, The speech 
nr  Y (18-19)  Y (21)  Y (24-25)      nr Y (20-21,37)  N (3-4,29)  Y (18-19,26) N (20,25) Budgell, A letter to a friend 
Y (15-17)  Y (36-38)  Y (12-13)  Y (5,41-42)  N (36-37,40) Y (5,41-42)    nr nr N (15) Dalrymple, Time bargains 
Y (12)  Y (9)  N (11,14,16) & Y (12) N (17-18)  Y (17)  N (16)  Y (8,12)    nr N (15)  Way, The case of contracts 
Notes: N = No; Y = Yes; nr = ‘no reference, or question was not discussed’; numbers in brackets are page references. 
Source: see text. 
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Supplementary Appendix III: Data sources – a comparative analysis of 
Freke, Castaing and South Sea directors’ dealings through brokers 
 
The data that come from Freke’s Prices of stocks and Castaing’s The course 
will appear to be practically the same data if some care is taken in the 
adjustments that will make the two datasets properly comparable. It is useful 
to do this comparison, not to show that one dataset is superior to the other 
(that is usually not the case), but to understand what both datasets have tell us 
about South Sea values. The data in Freke and Castaing are at times 
ambiguous because neither source bothers to define the terminology it uses. 
We must sometimes look at external sources to understand what Castaing and 
Freke show. The previously unanalysed data contained in the abstracts of 
brokers’ ledgers that were gathered up by the investigating Committee of 
Secrecy in 1721 could be of potential help here.
58
At the height of the South Sea Bubble, Freke and Castaing reported 
several South Sea original share values per day. We know not the time of day 
of either the first or the last of the quoted values; we can only hope that the 
data were reported in some time-consistent manner, but in the end there were 
no time-stamped data in 1720. If we take the last daily value figures from both 
Castaing and Freke, the following comparative picture emerges. 
 
 
                                                 
58 The Committee of Secrecy made its reports to the House of Commons in 1721 and left 
behind a valuable, but little used collection of papers at the House of Lords Record Office. 
The Committee was keenly interested in Directors' trade in South Sea liabilities and thus we 
have a number of abstracts of ledgers belonging to brokers who had dealings with South Sea 
directors. From these ledger abstracts I have recorded as many trades and in as great detail as 
possible. These records themselves are far from perfect. They do not cover the entirety of 
Directors’ dealings, only those dealings accomplished through brokers, and they most 
certainly exclude some accounts that the Committee of Secrecy would have liked to have seen, 












Figure A.III.1. South Sea original share values with closings, 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocks, Castaing, The course, and BL, Add. MS 25,499.























































































































The numbers from the two sources are practically the same except in the 
significant period of the midsummer closing of the Company’s transaction 
ledgers when, for some set of future delivery contracts (in both sources 
associated with contracts ‘for the opening’ of the transfer ledgers – widely 
understood to be about 22 August), Freke reported values that included rights 
to the 10 per cent midsummer stock dividend; The course values were for a set 
of contracts that did not include rights to the declared 10 per cent dividend. 
Given that there is no way of ascertaining whether Freke and Castaing were 
looking at the same set of future delivery contracts, it must be remarked that 
in the figure it looks very much as if they were. In the period of 23 June - 22 
August 1720, if we deflate the Freke spot value data by a 10 per cent discount 
factor (1/1.1), we obtain data that very closely mimic, in level and variation, 
the Castaing data from the same period.   38
There are some minor modifications to this story that we should note. At 
the beginning of the ‘closing’ period, there were clearly a few days in which 
both Freke and Castaing were reporting the same values – some future 
delivery values with the 10 per cent stock dividend. It is not until about 2 July 
that Castaing clearly starts to report differently from Freke. There is also a 
one-day downward-pointing spike in the Freke data on 28 July. This spike 
represents a £100 one-day drop and rebound. This is most unlikely to have 
occurred and is not mirrored in the Castaing data. A printer’s error is not a 
likely explanation since the spike is reflected in the entire range of values 
reported by Freke on that day. The most likely explanation is that for one day, 
and for one day only, Freke reported values without rights to the midsummer 
dividend. That the bottom of the spike is precisely coincident with the 
Castaing data is consistent with that explanation. Finally, there is a short, but 
significant, period of the closing of the transfer ledgers in early September. 
Neither Freke nor Castaing (nor DJT) take note of this closing.
59  
Consequently, we have no information about the nature of the values being 
reported by either Freke or Castaing in that short period. Were these some sort 
of future delivery values for the re-opening of the transfer ledgers?
60  
Whatever they were, they were clearly reported in both Freke and Castaing in 
the same way. 
                                                 
59 BL Add. MS 25,499, Court minutes, 25 August 1720. The books were ordered to be shut 
till 21 September. The closing was thought opportune while the management of subscriptions 
was discussed. There was discussion of a possible rights issue for those persons who were 
subscribing government annuities into South Sea stock. This idea was abandoned and there 
was discussion about a possible further money subscription. In the end this idea too was also 
abandoned and the transfer books were ordered (11 September) to be re-opened on the next 
day. 
60 The forward delivery contract in dispute in Maber vs. Thornton, The cases of the defendant 
and plaintiff, was undertaken 7 September for ‘the next opening’. On 12 September Maber   39
So, after 23 August Freke and Castaing report practically the same 
values, but how are these post-summer values comparable to pre-summer 
values? 22 June was the ex-dividend date for shares, but the Company did not 
order the 10 per cent midsummer stock dividend to be made out until 6 
August 1720.
61 And regardless of what the Company ordered in that way, we 
know that persons continued to privately trade in original shares ‘with 
dividend’ long after the summer of 1720.
62 There is a September 1720 note in 
Freke that suggests he was reporting prices with the midsummer dividend. On 
the other hand, Castaing was reporting quite the same values as was Freke at 
that time, but in midsummer had reported values without dividend. Castaing 
made the change from one reporting regime to the other without comment. 
The HLRO broker ledgers are no help to us here in determining what the two 
price courants are reliably reporting. We find only one instance in which a 
Company officer (Robert Knight) made a trade in original shares with an 
explicit mention that the trade carried the midsummer dividend. More archival 
research will be required to discover post-summer trades that distinguish 
clearly between values that contain the midsummer dividend and those that do 
not. It appears most safe at this point to take Freke at face value and treat his 
(and Castaing’s) as entirely ‘with dividend’ in the post-summer period. 
The HLRO broker ledgers record nearly one-thousand separate spot 
transactions at more than six-hundred unique prices and dates. Before and 
                                                                                                                               
failed to take delivery of the stock, which precipitated Thornton’s successful suit. The forward 
price was £690, which was precisely in the middle of the prices reported by Freke on that day. 
61 BL Add. MS 25,499, 6 August 1720. 
62 Post-summer trade in shares ‘with dividend’ was common enough that primary sources are 
at pains to specify when a trade excluded the dividend. For example, Pheasant (or Phoesuant) 
Crisp (a broker), in arranging a contract between the Duke of Portland and Sir John Meres, 
takes care to tell the Duke that the shares in question will be without the midsummer dividend 
(Portland (London) MS, Pw B 8, 20).   40
after midsummer 1720 these transaction values cluster very closely round both 
Freke and Castaing values. There were also a number of Directors dealing in 
the midsummer period ‘for the opening’. These latter trades all appear to be 
with the midsummer dividend since they cluster around the values reported by 
Freke in that period. 
Conclusion A.III.1: The Freke and Castaing data on ‘spot’ South Sea 
share values are mutually consistent with each other. To make data from 
the two sources strictly comparable in midsummer 1720, an adjustment 
factor of 1.1 needs to be applied. In the case of the Freke data, the 
midsummer ‘future’ share values and later values already incorporate 
that adjustment factor. In the case of the Castaing data, the adjustment 
factor needs to be applied from the closing of the transfer ledgers, 23 
June up to 23 August. After 23 August, it appears that Castaing reports 
spot values in precisely the same way as does Freke. The Freke and 
Castaing data also appear to be adequate sources of record for spot 
values. For the transfer of original South Sea shares dated transaction 
prices that are found in archives, such as the abstracts of broker’ ledgers 
at the HLRO, usually are quite close to values reported in Freke and 
Castaing. 
 
We turn our attention now to the South Sea subscription issues. The 
values of first and second subscription shares did not appear in The course 
until 28 May. Values appeared earlier in Freke’s lists with Issue No. 94 on 17 
May, 1720. Subscription share values were reported almost as frequently as 
were the values of original South Sea shares, but by the reopening of 
Company share transfer ledgers in late August, The course was reporting the 
values of subscription issues about twice in a week while Freke continued to 
report subscription share values on a daily basis until mid-November. The 
course continued to report intermittently through the rest of 1720. 
Traded subscription share values are found also in the HLRO abstracts 
of brokers’ ledgers. Directors’ trades that appear in these ledger abstracts may 
reflect their private trading as well as sales and purchases directly from and to   41
the subscription lists, which were under the control of various Directors. 
Almost all of the Directors’ trades that appear in these ledger abstracts took 
place before September 1720 and most of them were quite early in the life of 
the subscription issues. This suggests that the Directors used some broker 
services to place a number of subscriptions in the hands of subscribers. The 
vast bulk of placements of subscriptions, however, must have been achieved 
by Directors direct dealings with subscribers.
63  
As with the spot values for South Sea shares, the values for subscription 
shares that come from Freke and Castaing are quite close to each other if one 
but takes some care in making the proper adjustments to the raw data from the 
two sources. Castaing follows a more consistent method than does Freke in 
reporting subscription values. Throughout 1720 Castaing reports subscription 
values as premia over and above payments made on the shares.
64 There is no 
clear indication in The course that this is what is being done at all times, but 
we can infer Castaing’s method from concurrent recorded transactions in 
subscription shares that appear in the HLRO broker ledger abstracts. In those 
abstracts there are a number of entries that record transactions under a 
Castaing-like price and then also record the total value of the transaction by 
adding in the instalment payments that were due on the subscription share 
                                                 
63 The Committee of Secrecy was most interested in tracking down owners of ‘fictitious’ 
stock – primarily influential persons who were credited (in secret ledgers) with stock earlier in 
1720. The Committee, however, also came to learn that a similar phenomenon arose with the 
subscriptions, particularly the third subscription. 
64 Detailed knowledge of the instalment schedules for subscription shares is, of course, 
necessary before accurate subscription share values can be calculated from the data contained 
in The course or Prices of stocks. There were changes in all four subscription series’ 
instalment schedules at several points in 1720. The changes were few and simple for the first 
two subscriptions and frequent and complex for the third and fourth subscriptions. See supp. 
app. IV.   42
being traded.
65 The same method is followed by Freke until 25 June when the 
words ‘included’ appear by the side of subscription values. Sure enough on 
that date the reported values in Freke make an upward jump of approximately 
the size of the instalments already due to be paid on the shares. Thereafter the 
Freke subscription values are separated from the Castaing values by the 
approximate total of the instalments due on subscription shares. By later 
October the methods that Freke uses in reporting subscription values appear to 
become erratic in that they seem to vary from premium/discount-reporting, 
such as was consistently followed in The course, to reporting values with 
instalments ‘included’. 
How do the subscription values from Freke and Castaing compare? 
Looking first at the first subscription we can see there are no noticeable 
differences between the two value series in the figure A.III.2. There is no 
visible separation between the levels of the two series except for a few 
observations in September 1720 when it appears that the Castaing values are 
distinctly higher than those produced by Freke. This difference, however, is 
well within the bounds of the interday variation of subscription values 
displayed by both series; given that all share values were falling very rapidly 
in September, values for shares may appear to be consistently higher when 
coming from a reporter who is being a bit slow in reporting values. Castaing 
was reporting subscription share values only twice a week in this period and 
Freke was reporting them for all trading days of the week, so it would not be 
surprising if Freke’s reports were a bit fresher than were Castaing’s. 
                                                 
65 HLRO Box 158, Accounts of South Sea stock, bought-and-sold by James Testard, Thomas 
Lockyer, Charles Lockyer, Edward Owen, Joseph Shaw.   43
The final observation to make on the figure is the close correspondence 
of the Directors’ transaction prices to both Freke and Castaing, except in that 
significant period when the Company’s share transaction ledgers were closed. 
There were a number of Directors’ dealings at values that correspond 
precisely with values indicated by both Freke and Castaing in this period. At 
the same time there are an equal number of Directors’ dealings in subscription 
shares at values at substantial variance with those reported by Freke or 
Castaing. It is difficult to judge what possible sources for such variation might 
have been. It is possible that some of the Directors’ trades might have been 
recorded in ways that suggest the trades were spot trades from or to 
subscription lists when, in fact, some of the trades might have been forward 
delivery agreements for the delivery of subscription receipts. (This is actually 
a preliminary conclusion because the ledger abstracts do offer some limited 
means for distinguishing between spot and forward trades in subscription 
shares that we have not exploited yet.) This should not have been likely in the 
midsummer period – the first subscription receipts would have largely been 
delivered out by that time.
66 We do have some evidence, however, that the 
receipts for the second subscription were considerably delayed.
67 If such was 
still the case for some first subscription receipts, then it is conceivable that 
                                                 
66 The Duke of Portland had to wait until the end of May before he received the receipts for 
his very substantial purchases of the first subscription (Portland (London) MS, Pw B 165, 
pp.13-4). 
67 An account of the subscriptions, pp. 15-6. When the third subscription lists were being 
made out (17-21 June), there were still people trying to obtain receipts for the earlier 
subscriptions When an instalment was paid, the owner of a receipt was supposed to have the 
payment acknowledged by endorsement entered onto the receipt by one of Company’s clerks 
or officials. Subscribers thus could not easily present evidence to buyers of their receipts that 
instalments had been paid without having had their receipts endorsed by a Company official. 
Pheasant Crisp in one of his many newsletters to the Duke of Portland related how the 
Company was making an effort to issue receipts for the second subscription as late as 25 July 
1720 (Portland (London) MS, Pw B 8, 10).   44
some Directors were still selling first subscription shares on a forward 
delivery basis in which substantial premia for counterparty risk might have 
played a role in determining transaction prices. There is just not enough 
evidence yet to judge. Given that both Freke and Castaing appear to be good 
records of the Directors’ transaction prices outside of the midsummer period 
and that both reflect occasionally such transaction values within the 
midsummer period, it is probably safe to conclude that both Freke and 
Castaing are accurate sources of record for first subscription share values. 
Conclusion A.III.2: Both Freke and Castaing give up essentially the 
same measures of first subscription shares values once proper account of 
the two different methods used for reporting such values were followed 
in the two sources. Both sources also appear to be reliable sources of 
record for transaction prices. Either time series illustrated in figure 
A.III.2 will be comparable to spot value time series from either source. 
No adjustment factor need be applied to subscription share values across 
the midsummer (22 June) divide. The reason for this was the declaration 
(from April) that subscriptions would carry the midsummer 10 per cent 
stock dividend until such time as the subscriptions were ‘made stock’. 
That is, all subscription shares would have rights to the 10 per cent stock 
dividend until they were fully paid up.
68 This rule applied until the end 
of 1720. The HLRO broker ledger data also appear to splice well with 
the Freke data and we conclude that the HLRO data is an adequate 









                                                 
68 The fourth subscription was granted the 10% midsummer dividend even though it came 
after the midsummer ex-dividend date. See BL Add. MS 25,499, Court minutes, 25 August 














































Figure A.III.2. South Sea first subscription share values, 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocks, Castaing, The course, and HLRO Box 158
                1st. sub. values (Freke)                    1st. sub. values (Castaing)         1st. sub. values (HLRO)
 
When we turn our attention next to the second subscription shares, the 
comparison of Freke and Castaing becomes more problematic. Castaing 
reports values for second subscription shares in the same way as he did for 
first subscription shares; they were reported as premia exclusive of 
instalments already paid or due. Likewise, Freke reports his values in the same 
way until midsummer, when he starts to report them on an ‘included’ basis, 
just as he did for the first subscription shares. There are some Directors’ 
transaction prices in the second subscription shares that we can use for 
comparison although they are unfortunately not as numerous as they were for 
the first subscription shares. As was the case for the first subscription shares, 
there are a number of early transactions in second subscription shares that 
predate the midMay period from which Freke starts to report prices. These 
observed Directors’ transaction values meld nicely into those reported by 
Freke from midMay. There is also a rough correspondence between these   46
transaction values and the Freke/Castaing values up through the midsummer 
period. It is unfortunate, however, we have not yet any good sources for 
second subscription transaction values after the midsummer period because it 
is in that period that comparison between Freke and Castaing becomes more 
of a problem. The problem is apparent in figure A.III.3. Castaing-reported 
values are higher than are Freke-reported values from about mid-September 
onwards. This was the case for the first subscription values as well, as we saw, 
but in the case of the second subscription values it is noticeably persistent into 





































Figure A.III.3. South Sea second subscription share values, 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocks, Castaing, The course, and HLRO Box 158
                2nd. sub. values (Freke)                    2nd. sub. values (Castaing)         2nd. sub. values (HLRO)  47
Freke values are somehow ‘too low’ or Castaing values are ‘too high’. 
The first thing to note is that, neither series is ‘too low’ relative to spot share 
values; both the Freke and Castaing series are well above share spot values in 
this period. Figure A.III.4 illustrates this. The interesting question concerns 
what adjustments to either series would reconcile one series to the other. 
There are actually several possibilities. All possible adjustments have to take 
into account the following facts. In the original instalment schedule for the 
second subscription, the second instalment was due on 14 September.
69 This is 
very close to the date on which both series visibly part company from each 
other. Then on approximately the 2 November there is a large drop in the level 
of Freke’s second subscription values that is consistent with his reportage 
shifting to an ‘excluded’ basis only a short time before his reportage of 
subscription share values comes to an end. That is, if £80 (the amounts of 
money due on the second subscription) is added to Freke’s values, a series of 
numbers consistent with Castaing’s reportage emerges on or after the 2 
November. 
                                                 
69 DJT, p. 264, believed mistakenly that the instalment schedule was changed completely and 
permanently around 22 July 1720. Being dependent upon the reports of instalment schedules 
printed by Freke and Castaing, their confusion is understandable. Castaing, for example, 
printed a schedule on 15 July that was similar to the ‘original’ schedule that DJT report in 
table 1 (p. 235). The next week on 22 July Castaing printed a schedule similar to the ‘revised’ 
schedule that DJT have in table 1. On 9 August Castaing printed a more refined version of 
this schedule that has the second payment date at the 14 September. What DJT believed was a 
changed schedule of instalment payments was actually, however, the original schedule as it 
first appeared in the Copy of the minute books of the general courts of the directors, pp. 66-7, 
29 April 1720 (HLRO Bundle P2). It took a mere three months for Castaing and Freke to print 




































Figure A.III.4. Second subscription share values, unadjusted, autumn 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocksand Castaing, The course.
                Original share values (Castaing)                    2nd. sub. values (Freke)         2nd. sub. values (Castaing)
 
Three possible ways to reconcile the two datasets suggest themselves – 
from the least likely to the most likely they are: 
1)  There was an alteration in the instalment schedule that delayed 
the payment of the second instalment of £40 from 14 September 
to approximately 2 November. The Freke values, being reported 
on an ‘included’ basis would therefore be the correct values and 
the Castaing values depicted are too high by about £40 because 
they appear in the figure with an imputed £40 instalment in their 
value that was not yet due to be paid. This explanation is 
unlikely for several reasons. First, the record of such an 
alteration would have had to disappear simultaneously from 
several historical sources. Amongst the minutes of the General   49
Court and the Treasury Committee such an alteration would have 
been noted as were all the other alterations in instalment 
schedules for the other subscription series.  The Proceedings of 
the Court of Directors as well as Boyer’s The Political State of 
Great Britain reported a few otherwise unnoted motions and 
debates amongst the South Sea Directors and ownership. All of 
these sources would have to have omitted reports of events that 
in other circumstances were considered quite important and were 
usually reported duly. The argument for this explanation is that 
such an event, if it occurred, might well have been crowded out 
of the reportage. Recorded minutes on the Company’s actions in 
mid-September were largely about discussions of the fourth 
subscription and a possible new subscription for shares by rights 
for the annuitants. There was also extensive analysis of the initial 
discussions with the Bank of England in the negotiations 
surrounding the Bank Contract.
70 A delay in an instalment 
payment on a subscription, before the full extent of the coming 
crisis would become fully appreciated, might well have 
disappeared underneath more momentous news. 
2)  Freke was simply getting sloppy and forgetting to include the 
second £40 instalment in his ‘included’ values. Then about 2 
November, he alters his reportage to an ‘excluded’ basis without 
passing a note about it to his readers. The argument against this 
was that 14 September to 2 November is a very long period for 
                                                 
70 BL Add. MS 25,499, Court minutes, September 1720, pp. 186-93.   50
such sloppiness to persist. The best argument for ‘Freke-
sloppiness’ is that by October 1720 Prices of stocks  contains 
quite variable reporting in some fashion or another that is 
difficult to determine. There is an interday variation in his 
reported values that are not reflected in Castaing’s series. It must 
be admitted that since Castaing reported less frequently than did 
Freke, it is possible that Castaing’s reported subscription values 
just happen to miss out a higher–frequency variation in values 
that is captured in Freke’s data. To take some examples (as they 
are reported in the raw figures), Freke reports a value of £50 (11 
October), £5 for the (12 October) and £50 again on 13 October. 
The intervening £5 value might reflect a true fluctuation in value 
and we cannot compare it easily to Castaing’s data because 
Castaing simply reports values for the 11
th (£15) and the 14
th 
(£10). Both Freke and Castaing contain some examples in which 
broken typeface or obvious printer’s errors make data difficult to 
decipher. Could the printer have dropped a ‘0’ after the ‘£5’ 
reported for the 12 October? Perhaps, but this kind of variation 
in the Freke data, which is absent in the Castaing data, happens 
twice more before 2 November. Neither is this interday variation 
reflected in Freke’s reporting of any other subscription values, 
nor is it reflected in any coincident variation in either Freke or 
Castaing spot share values. Something is happening to Freke’s 
method of reporting of second subscription share values that is   51
unique to those shares alone. Whatever it is, its presence 
becomes obvious only in October. 
3)  A third possibility is related to the second that we have just 
discussed, but I believe it is more likely. In early September it 
was resolved at a General Court of the Directors that subscribers 
could ‘use’ all promised dividends (including the midsummer 
stock dividend) to meet forthcoming instalment payments.
71 The 
first such instalment that could be met this way was the second 
payment on the second subscription. Since instalments on the 
second subscription (as well as the first and third subscriptions) 
were all 10 per cent of the subscription’s issue price, the 
Directors’ intention behind the announcement was clearly to tell 
subscribers that they could miss their next instalment payment as 
long as they were willing to forego a 10 per cent stock dividend 
on those shares whenever they were ‘made stock’. From that 
point forward it would have been up to Freke and Castaing to 
decide how subscription share values would be reported – 
without or with the stock dividend. So, for argument’s sake, 
suppose for the moment that Castaing consistently reported 
subscription values ‘with dividend’ but ‘excluding’ actual cash 
instalments due. At the same time, suppose that Freke reported 
second subscription share values ‘without dividend’ but 
‘including’ actual cash instalments paid. If you then additionally 
suppose that on about 2 November Freke simply switched to   52
reporting share values ‘excluding’ instalments (as did Castaing), 
but still without the dividend, then you could correct the Freke 
values to put them on a comparable basis with Castaing’s. The 












Figure A.III.5. Second subscription share values, adjusted, autumn 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocksand Castaing, The course.























We are not going to argue that the adjustments depicted in the figure are to be 
preferred before Freke’s data are used in analysis. More evidence is needed 
before it can be definitively stated that either Freke’s or Castaing’s second 
subscription series need such adjustments. 
 
Conclusion A.III.3:  Until mid-September 1720, both Freke and Castaing give 
up essentially the same measures of second subscription share values once 
proper account of the two different methods used for reporting such values 
were followed in the two sources. Both sources also appear to be reliable 
sources of record for transaction prices through the midsummer period as 
well. From mid-September Freke reports consistently lower subscription share 
values than does Castaing, for reasons that cannot yet be easily determined. 
We would therefore conclude that for testing hypotheses that depend upon the 
                                                                                                                               
71 HLRO Bundle P2, Copy of the minute books of the general courts of the directors, p. 137, 8 
September.   53
level of subscription values, one dataset or the other will be the conservative 
and preferred choice. Since the DJT hypothesis, for example, is favoured by 
lower subscription value data, the Castaing data would be the conservative 
dataset of choice. The early HLRO data again splices nicely with the Freke 
data and it would appear to be fair to treat it as an extension of the Freke data. 
 
We come now to the third subscription issue, which was created from 
about 17 June and traded (apparently) only till the end of September. The 
Castaing-based values along with two varieties of values from Freke are 
depicted in figure A.III.6. Along with these values are transaction values 
garnered from the HLRO broker-ledger abstracts.   One of the Freke-based 
price series started only in early August and was labelled ‘for mony’. DJT 
quite reasonably presume
72 that the ‘for mony’ price was the spot price for the 
promise of the future delivery of a subscription receipt. They presume - 
equally reasonably - that the other price corresponded to a forward delivery 
contract that would be settled later, perhaps at some fixed date or upon 
delivery of third subscription receipts. DJT refer to the latter prices as 
‘regular’ or ‘forward/forward’. 
                                                 
72 DJT, p. 243, assert that the distinction between the two types of contracts ‘is clearly 
described in the contemporary pamphlet literature’ and cite (fn. 50) the anonymous pamphlet 
A full confutation, p. 11. This is a good example of the many texts in which the contemporary 
terminology of contracts is used and in which it is clear that the writer is assuming that his 
readers know what he is writing about. DJT also cite Paterson vs. Graham (fn. 51) as an 
example of a legal case in which the distinction between the types of contracts is made clear. 
This is not a good example, at all. There is one and only one forward delivery agreement for 
South Sea stock involved in the case and there is nothing in the case that speaks to two 
different types of forward agreements. The forward agreement in question is actually a 
combination of the two types of contract and, to make matters more complicated, forward 
delivery was going to be shared by two individuals. The dispute in the suit was about who had 
been given the agency powers for arranging this forward agreement. DJT’s distinction 
between what they call ‘forward/forward contracts’ and ‘spot/forward contracts’ is a quite 
reasonable one because the distinction makes sense in a wide range of contexts in which the 
terminology appears. The best example of such sources that we use in this paper is the 
Pheasant Crisp’s letters to the Duke of Portland. In several letters he reports prices for the 
third subscription ‘for the delivery of the receipts’ (Portland (London) MS, Pw B 8, 8-19), the 
same term used by the writer of A full confutation. These prices clearly match up with the 
Freke prices that DJT call ‘regular’ or ‘forward/forward’ prices. Thus we have another piece 
of contextual evidence that Freke prices are forward prices for some unspecified delivery date 





































Figure A.III.6. Third subscription share values, 1720
Source: Freke, Prices of stocks,Castaing, The course, HLRO Box 158, and Portland (London) MS
                Freke 'regular'                  Freke 'for mony'                   Castaing          HLRO            Crisp 'regular'              Crisp 'for money'
The first thing to notice about figure A.III.6 is that the apparent 
distances between Freke’s ‘regular’ and ‘for mony’ prices are actually quite 
large. The difference between the two prices is about £60, narrowing only to 
about £40 before the values disappear from the listings. A few earlier 
examples of the same kind of prices were reported to the Duke of Portland in 
a series of letters from his broker, Pheasant Crisp.
73 These prices indicate an 
earlier gap of about £70 to £80. The second thing to notice about the figure is 
that all the depicted transaction prices (except two) that come from the HLRO 
ledger abstracts are ‘selling’ prices. That is, they are prices at which South Sea 
Directors or other Company officers sold (via brokers) the third subscription 
                                                                                                                               
to decipher from their contexts. It would be better still if clear financial definitions appeared 
in early eighteenth century works, but they rarely do.    55
to the public.
74 The Crisp prices indicate a very clear connection between 
Directors’ high selling prices and the Freke ‘regular’ prices. A significant 
exception to this observation is that in the middle weeks of July some 
Directors’ selling prices are significantly higher than any of the values 
reported by Freke or Castaing. There is also a very clear Crisp connection 
between the lowest prices at which Directors sold and the Freke ‘for mony’ 
prices. Although there are some Director sales of the third subscription ‘for 
mony’, the HLRO data clearly indicate that Directors were more heavily into 
the sale of receipts ‘for time’, just as many pamphlet writers suspected and 
complained of. What is interesting about the HLRO data is that for an 
identifiable group of subscription sellers (the Directors), the differences 
between ‘for time’ and ‘for mony’ prices are about the same as the differences 
between the respective prices reported by Freke. The differences are described 
by DJT in the following way. 
Contracts for money were risky, since they involved in effect an 
unsecured loan to the seller of receipts, and they also implied loss of 
interest to the buyer on the money deposited. Accordingly, the ( … ) ‘for 
money’ quoted prices are significantly lower than the regular 
forward/forward prices quoted by Freke.
75
 
Of course, the buyer ‘for mony’ loses interest if he cannot immediately obtain 
a tradable receipt (which was indeed the case), but this could not conceivably 
have given rise to such large differences between ‘regular’ and ‘for mony’ 
                                                                                                                               
73 cf. fn. 72. The broker’s name may indeed have been avian, but the variance of spelling with 
which it appears in the archives (ex. Phoesuant) is considerable. 
74 Some pamphlet writers state a belief that the highest prices commanded in sales of the third 
subscription were attained in sales by the Directors themselves. We find in Restitution: a law 
of the land (p. 2), ‘(t)he Sellers, who are they? They are the late Directors, and their Agents, 
&c ( … )’ and in Reasons for making void ‘those very Persons, who have sold for Time, have 
since reduced those Subscriptions in such a manner that the Stock is thereby ( … ) worse than 
it was’. 
75 DJT, p. 243.   56
prices as are observed in figure A.III.6. Perhaps it could be argued that the 
risk the seller would not deliver a receipt was greater in a ‘for mony’ contract 
than it would be in a ‘for time’ contract, but why would that have to be? The 
price difference could just as easily be justified as a seller’s premium in the 
face of the risk that a buyer ‘for time’ will default. 
Default by a buyer of a subscription ‘for time’ would encompass a 
default on not only the value of the deposit on a subscription, but also the 
promised premium. Such a default would thus be a larger default than the 
default committed by a subscriber who simply fails to pay his subscription 
deposit, but there should be some proportionality between the two risks. We 
have already seen that many so-called subscribers did not pay a deposit, but 
still managed to secure a place in the third subscription from accommodating 
Directors.
76 The highest selling prices that Directors would ever demand from 
anyone in a ‘for time’ bargain for a subscription receipt would probably be 
demanded from just such people. The highest selling prices by Directors best 
correspond to Freke’s ‘regular’ prices and Crisp prices ‘for the delivery of the 
receipts’. 
Conclusion A.III.4: The substantial difference between Freke’s and Crisp’s 
‘regular’ and ‘for mony’ prices for the third subscription could possibly have 
reflected a seller’s premium in the face of default risk from buyers. Many of 
the sellers were Directors. 
 
How big are the differences between ‘regular’ and ‘for mony’ values in 
percentage terms? On the basis of the Freke values that appear in figure 
A.III.6 they are at least 3 per cent and no more than 7 per cent of the ‘for 
mony’ values. These are actually huge numbers. DJT are willing to assume 
                                                 
76 cf. fns. 53, 54.   57
that subscription receipts ‘are expected ( … ) to be delivered out two months 
after the issue date’.
77 So, on an annual basis the ‘regular’-relative-to-‘for 
mony’ price premia would be about 18 per cent to 42 per cent, the larger 
figure being prevalent in the late summer period in which the share transfer 
ledgers were still closed. We have already noted that in the earlier Crisp 
values the nominal premia appear to be even larger. Crisp also had some 
thoughts on this issue. In the pamphlet literature we have discovered the 
accusation that the highest prices at which the third subscription were sold 
were sales by the Directors.
78 One of the Crisp letters pitches in on this theme, 
( … ) I have a private hint from the S Sea Treasury that the receipts for 
the same will be out in less than 2 months, & in consequence as the price for 
ready money is but 240 p.c. advance, it ought not be above 270 or 80 at most 
for the coming out of the receipts, whereas they keep it up at 320, upon the 
false notion of having 4 or 5 months time for payment ( … ).
79
 
Crisp implies that, under a false rumour put about by the Directors, 
subscription receipts (and the payments that would be due upon them) are 
supposed to be long delayed. Thus a larger forward premium than otherwise 
would be expected appears in the forward delivery prices for the third 
subscription. The added premium is quite large in percentage terms. It is 
nominally about £40 (£320 - £280), which is about 3.5 per cent of ‘the money’ 
value (£800 [PVcalls] + £240 advance + £100 deposit) for that subscription. In 
other words, in Crisp’s mind an extra two to three month’s wait for a 
subscription receipt should add (in percentage annual terms) at least 14 per 
cent per annum (4×3.5 p.c.) and as much as 21 per cent per annum (6×3.5 
p.c.) to the forward premium. 
                                                 
77In note (j) app. III (p. 267). 
78cf. fn. 74.   58
 
Conclusion A.III.5: The price premia in the third subscription 
‘forward/forward’ contracts versus the ‘spot/forward’ contracts, as they are 
defined by DJT, are at least as large as 18 per cent per annum and could be as 
large as 42 per cent per annum in the Freke data. The Crisp data would appear 
to contain premia of about the same size. 
.. 
 
We could proceed further in our analysis with a comparison of fourth 
subscription values given by Freke and Castaing. We would have, 
unfortunately, no help from the record of the broker-ledger abstracts, for no 
record of Directors’ dealings (excepting three sales by Robert Knight) will be 
found there for the fourth subscription. There are very few observations of 
values of the fourth subscription (DJT use the only 29 available daily 
observations in their analyses) from either Freke or Castaing in any case. 
Whether these observations are much use in econometric analysis is 
debatable, but there is certainly one observation about the fourth subscription 
values that can be stated with assurance (and can be equally well stated for the 
third subscription values as well): 
Conclusion A.III.6: No third or fourth subscription share value is below or 
even remotely close to the ‘spot’ values for South Sea shares. This requires no 
detailed examination or comparison of sources, but is immediately observable 
in DJT’s Figure 1. 
 
 
Supplementary Appendix IV: South Sea subscription shares, instalment 
payments, and their present values 
 
In this Appendix is described the mechanics of the South Sea Company’s 
subscription issues. There were four issues. The first two issues in April 1720 
provide the most useable data. The third and fourth subscriptions priced shares 
initially at £1000 each. The fourth subscription indeed offers very little in the 
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way of value data. Each issue is described below along with its instalment 
schedules. At the end of the Appendix we explain how the present values of 
instalments are calculated. 
 
First and Second Subscription Issues 
 
The first subscription issue was planned soon after 6 Geo. 1, c. 4 came into 
force on 7 April 1720. Formal issues began in the week of 14 April and in the 
Court minutes of the 19 and 20 April the management of the first issue and the 
newly planned second issue were discussed. The subscription price was set to 
£300 to be paid in 9 instalments. The first issue’s instalment schedule was 
thus: 
First subscription shares instalment schedule
14 April 1720 £60 
14 June 1720 £30 
15 August 1720 £30 
14 October 1720 £30 
14 December 1720 £30 
14 February 1721 £30 
14 April 1721 £30 
14 June 1721 £30 
14 August 1721 £30 
 
In the 29 April meetings of the Company’s General Court a schedule for 
the second subscription was determined. The subscription price was £400 to 
be paid in 10 equal instalments.   60
 
Second subscription shares instalment 
schedule 
29 April 1720 £40 
14 September 1720 £40 
14 January 1721 £40 
14 May 1721 £40 
14 September 1721 £40 
14 December 1721 £40 
14 March 1722 £40 
14 June 1722 £40 
14 September 1722 £40 
14 December 1722 £40 
 
These schedules were printed from time to time, and with more or less 
accuracy, in The course from mid-July 1720, but it was not until the 9 August 
that  The course began to print accurate instalment schedules. The first 
mention of instalment schedules appears in Freke’s Prices of stocks (No. 75, 
24 June 1720) and a detailed set of schedules for subscriptions No. 1 through 
3 appears in the next issue and subsequent issues. On 13 October the Court of 
Directors thought it advisable to delay the payment of the fourth instalment on 




Third and Fourth Subscription Issues 
 
The last two series of subscription shares were issues of expensive shares. 
South Sea share values were perhaps near their peak and the total subscription 
price was set at £1000 for both issues. The first accurate reporting of the 
instalment schedule for the third subscription does not appear in The course 
                                                 
80 BL Add. MS 25,499, 13 October 1720, p. 7. Freke’s Prices of stocks reports this change in 
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until the 9 August issue, but the schedule printed there was adopted on 15 
June.
81 That schedule was: 
Third subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 15 June 1720 
16 June 1720 £100 
2 January 1721 £100 
2 July 1721 £100 
2 January 1722 £100 
2 July 1722 £100 
2 January 1723 £100 
2 July 1723 £100 
2 January 1724 £100 
2 July 1724 £100 
2 January 1725 £100 
 
By mid-August 1720 it was clear that the firm was starved for cash. 
There was a noticeable panic in the measures the Directors proposed for 
raising more cash. The Court minutes record a proposed unworkable scheme 
for getting subscribers to pre-pay their instalments and then at the same 
meeting the 4
th and final cash subscription of shares was proposed, again at a 
subscription price of £1000 and with the following instalment schedule.
82
 
Fourth subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 12 August 1720 
25 September 1720 £200 
25 August 1721 £200 
25 August 1722 £100 
25 August 1723 £100 
25 August 1724 £100 
25 February 1725 £100 
25 August 1725 £100 
25 February 1726 £100 
 
At the same meeting, however, they also decided to amend the 
instalment schedule for the third subscription (£100 supposed to have been 
                                                 
81 BL Add. MS 25,499, 15 June 1720, p.136. Freke’s Prices of stocks reports a rough 
instalment schedule until, in the 2 August issue (No.86), there appears a fairly accurate 
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already paid). One indication that the third subscription issue was now failing 
was that the schedule was greatly lengthened and the Company allowed a 25 
September deadline for the first £100 to those individuals who had not yet 
paid their deposit: 
 
Third subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 12 August 1720 
25 September 1720 £100 
15 August 1721 £100 
15 August 1722 £100 
25 August 1723 £100 
25 August 1724 £100 
25 February 1725 £100 
25 August 1725 £100 
25 February 1726 £100 
25 August 1726 £100 
25 February 1727 £100 
 
 
Neither The course nor Prices of stocks ever displayed this revised schedule. 
Both price courants continued to print the 15 June-published schedule until 
the Company radically altered the terms of the third and fourth subscriptions 
on 30 September. 
The Company soon changed its mind yet again with respect to the fourth 
subscription and put forward the following revised shortened instalment 
schedule
83, which would again be quickly relengthened: 
 
Fourth subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 23 August 1720 
at subscription £200 
25 March 1721 £200 
25 September 1721 £200 
25 March 1722 £200 
25 September 1722 £200 
                                                                                                                               
82 BL Add. MS 25,499, 12 August 1720, pp. 158-64. 
83 This schedule appears briefly in the Prices of stocks from 26 August (No. 93) through 13 
September (No. 98).   63
 
On 25 August the Court resolved that the fourth subscription would follow the 
same instalment schedule followed by the third subscription, but the Court 
minutes did not say what that joint schedule would be. In the 16 September 
issue (No. 99) of Freke’s Prices of stocks a new schedule for the fourth 
subscription is shown alongside Freke’s long-running 15-June schedule for 
the third subscription. The two schedules are almost the same and may have 
accurately reflected the adjustments referred to in the 25 August Court 
minutes. The newly reported schedule for the fourth subscriptions instalments 
was: 
Fourth subscription shares instalment schedule, 
reported Freke, 16 September 1720 
August 1720 £200 
February 1721 £100 
August 1721 £100 
February 1722 £100 
August 1722 £100 
February 1723 £100 
August 1723 £100 
February 1724 £100 
August 1724 £100 
 
The Court minutes recorded (25 August) that something had to be done 
to make the payment schedules on the third and fourth subscriptions more 
equitable, but we do not see a resolution of this issue until after share values 
have largely collapsed. At the Court of Directors on 30 September the third 
and fourth subscriptions' subscription prices were announced to both be 
revised downwards to £400 per share Two new instalment schedules were 
devised as shown below.
84 The revised terms and schedules appeared in the 
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respective 4 October and 7 October issues of The course and in the 4 October 
issue (No. 104) of Prices of stocks. 
 
Third subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 30 September 1720 
16 June 1720 £100 
2 July 1721 £40 
2 January 1722 £40 
2 July 1722 £40 
2 January 1723 £30 
2 July 1723 £30 
2 January 1724 £30 
2 July 1724 £30 
2 January 1725 £30 
2 July 1725 £30 
 
 
Fourth subscription shares instalment 
schedule, 30 September 1720 
6 August 1720 £200 
26 September 1721 £25 
26 March 1722 £25 
26 September 1722 £25 
26 March 1723 £25 
26 September 1723 £25 
26 March 1724 £25 
26 September 1724 £25 
26 March 1725 £25 
 
 
Using these instalment schedules we are able to calculate a time-series of the 
present-value of outstanding calls for each of the four subscription series. We 
have used 5 per cent per annum as the discount rate (the practice followed by 
DJT) and have in this paper used the discount yields on medium-term East 
India Bonds. Either choice gives practically the same results. 
There are two controversies about the use of discount rates in 1720 that 
are unnecessarily conflated together. One controversy is about the general 
expensiveness of credit and whether it contributed to the decline in South Sea   65
values, perhaps even as early as June 1720. The basic position taken by Neal 
is that there was a general rise in the expensiveness of credit and its 
availability as early as June 1720.
85 Opposed to that view are DJT who argue 
that there was no sign of restriction in credit or decline in liquidity because 
there is plenty of evidence that throughout the Bubble institutions such as the 
Bank of England lent money and the East India Company could borrow 
money at rates of about 4 to 5 per cent per annum.
86 Neal argues quite 
correctly that the special rates at which the East India Company could borrow 
on its bonds had something to do with the special provisions of the bonds as 
well as the high credit-standing of the Company itself, but such terms for 
borrowing did not describe the generality of credit conditions in 1720.
87 DJT 
were quite incorrect, for example, to implicitly assume that premia for the 
forward delivery of South Sea shares were small simply because examples of 
cheap borrowing terms could be found. The position taken by this paper in 
section IV, afterall, agrees with Neal in this controversy. The evidence in the 
Duke of Portland’s forward premia, for example, and the high lending rates 
for many persons (but not all) that feature in primary and secondary sources 
are all too numerous to be ignored.
88
The second controversy concerns the discount rate to be used in 
calculating the present value of subscription instalments. This is a very 
different issue, as we will show, but it has been lumped together with the first 
controversy. Just as he argues that high lending rates, driven by peoples’ 
                                                 
85 Neal, The rise of financial capitalism, pp. 101 and 111 and Neal, ‘Review of Richard Dale, 
The first crash, p. 4. 
86 DJT, p. 245. 
87 Neal, ‘Review of Richard Dale, The first crash, p. 3. 
88 Neal, ‘For God’s sake, remitt me’, p. 40.   66
unwillingness to hold other peoples’ paper (a liquidity crisis), was a prime 
cause in bringing down South Sea share values, Neal argues that low rates 
should not be used to calculate PVcall.
89 DJT argue for the use of low discount 
rates in this application because there is evidence that were a large number of 
individuals that still had access to credit on those terms.
90 Neither of the 
protagonists in this controversy appears to be in much disagreement about the 
location of what amounts to the risk-free rate of interest. It is on the order of 5 
per cent per annum. Where Neal really differs from DJT is about the extent of 
access to the market for such risk-free loans. Neal argues that such access 
became actually quite limited and this served to ‘prick’ the South Sea Bubble. 
DJT argue that access to the market was quite wide and that the peak of the 
South Sea Bubble was not pricked in this way and, indeed, carried on for a 
period after June. 
When it comes to using a discount rate for calculating PVcall, however, 
the relevant question about access to the market for risk-free loans is not 
whether such access was widely extensive, but whether such access existed to 
any degree at all. Under the ‘no barriers to arbitrage’ principle that underlies 
inequality 2 in section I of this paper, all that is required is some degree of 
access to the market for risk-free loans. The power of the arbitrage principle 
will then work in such a way to suggest that the risk-free discount rate is the 
appropriate rate to use in calculating PVcall.
91 The argument is as follows. 
Imagine that inequality 2 was reversed and there existed under-priced 
subscription shares. The smallest underpricing that can be imagined is one in 
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which PVcall is calculated using the risk-free discount rate. Any one person 
who had access to the market for risk-free loans could borrow the subscription 
price and the present value of calls, pay the calls, and thereby obtain an 
original share at a lower cost than required in the original share market. By 
selling his newly obtained share in the original share market, this person 
makes enough money to repay his loan and a profit besides. Why could he not 
perform this operation many times? So, even when access to the market for 
risk-free loans is highly limited, some arbitrageurs should still be able to 
generate large arbitrage profits. If we additionally assume that the markets for 
loans are accessible to more than just one person, then there is no reason we 
cannot suppose that arbitrageurs would compete with each other for profits 
until the original arbitrage opportunity that gave rise to the process disappears. 
This is what we mean by the power of the arbitrage principal; it need not 
depend upon a very extensive access to the market for risk-free loans. 
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